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As Tanzania scraps charges on card payments to boost digital payments, Mthuli’s 2% tax achieves the opposite in Zimbabwe

Leonard Sengere Avatar

Leonard Sengere

Zimswitch Smile to Pay

I still find it shocking that Zimbabwe is not as studied as it should be. The likes of Steve Hanke are fascinated, but most are sleeping on this treasure trove of case studies.

We have had so many monetary policy shenanigans that you can’t possibly remember it all off the top of your head. Some of our younger readers might not know that there was a time when the government pushed for electronic transactions, and the economy went all in on that.

Back in 2017, we wrote this headline: Electronic money now 70% of all payments in Zimbabwe…

Yes, the country had gone cashless—something you can’t even imagine happening in 2025. One of the major government decisions that put a halt to that cash-lite progress was the introduction of the 2% Integrated Money Transfer Tax (IMTT) in 2018.

The government got greedy when it saw billions of electronic transactions that it could tax. From that year, the country has been steadily moving back to cash. Today, no one prefers electronic payments if it can be helped.

I bring this all up because I’m seeing Tanzania walking down a road we once walked. Tanzania is trying to boost digital transactions.

Tanzania scraps charges on card payments

The Bank of Tanzania has eliminated charges on card payments to encourage digital transactions and promote a cash-lite economy.

The initiative, led by the Bank of Tanzania, applies to debit, credit, and prepaid card payments at point-of-sale (POS) machines, with penalties for merchants who violate the order. Digital payments are growing rapidly in Tanzania, with 48.4% of the population using digital platforms, bolstered by increased smartphone ownership and financial inclusion. Contrast that with the 70% we had reached in 2017.

The Tanzanians say the move aligns with the country’s economic growth, driven by key sectors like trade and financial services, and aims to enhance security, transparency, and convenience in transactions.

Tanzania, don’t do a Mthuli

The benefits of going cash-lite are there for everyone to see. This is why even the Zimbabwean government still tries to convince people to ditch cash.

Of course, when all digital transactions attract 2% charges from the government itself—before the banks, which are just as greedy if we’re being honest—digital transactions are way too expensive in Zimbabwe.

Cash carries no such costs. It is riskier to handle, but Mthuli doesn’t get 2% every time anyone pays someone when using cash. That’s a huge plus.

That’s not even considering the whole currency issue. So, yeah, the digital transaction dream in Zimbabwe was undone by the government and banks’ greed.

I wonder what would happen if the Zimbabwean government scrapped charges on digital payments—both the IMTT and bank and payment provider charges—like Tanzania is doing here. Would that spell trouble for some banks that rely too much on charges today? Or would Zimswitch survive without POS revenue? Would Mthuli keep his job if IMTT revenue was taken off the table?

I don’t have answers to these questions, but just posing them shows that we won’t be getting free card payments anytime soon in Zimbabwe. All the players involved in facilitating digital payments are too reliant on fee income for anything to be done. So, the march toward a fully cash economy will continue.

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  1. Cde Ernesto che guveira

    The gvt has ruined this country. I remember as early as 2012 a lot o people using the likes of ecocash nettcash etc to do their transactions. I even remember boarding a bus and paying via ecocash and swipe without any extra charges. Mutuvi has managed to undone all these good things

    Reply
  2. Simple solution

    If they want their tax they should drop bank charge to offset
    At current the bank making the same as the gvt both take 2%
    Simply drop the bank charge to 0.5% and the total cost drops to 3.5%
    Force them to be useful and find new sources of income

    Reply
    1. Hi

      Drops to 2.5%

      Reply
  3. MYST🀄

    For some reason our prevailing conditionings don’t strike me as greed. Let’s face it these guys are super wealthy already so it’s not really about the money, is it?. There are far greater human emotions that supercede money, like pride, jealousy and fear of humiliation. For example, a mother not wanting her son to be rich, then she goes to get muti/mushonga and conducts rituals ,which is strange behaviour because which mother wouldn’t want her son to be rich, because by proximity she then becomes rich too, she would want for nothing, so there are things that happen in life were money is not the primary motivator.

    This seems more about being an economic hit, because yes in the world there are economic hitmen, players behind the scenes who dictate the destiny of nations. It’s a competition and myopic leaders become pawns because their outlook is domestic not global, and for friendship and treasure they can turn a blind eye.

    Who would lose out in a strong and prosperous Zimbabwe? Who would lose out if our institutions are given back right and might? Who would lose out if our people become rich? Who would lose out if we become an agricultural and industrial power again, and losing is just not in terms of money and resources but the narrative which is a more powerful force than our economic malaise.

    We will pay what they want and do what they say. We cannot complain about our circumstances, these are the cards we have been dealt, we either continue or if people want it bad enough, we change the world.🇿🇼🌍

    Reply
  4. MYST🀄

    Do you know life is not linear, life can be very strange and rewarding. It’s not the life itself that is strange, no, it’s our cultural and societal indoctrination that precludes us from seeing beyond the horizons we are used too.

    For example, someone can be mature at 13 years of age, but someone else can still be immature at 90. We may dismiss the words from a 13 year old but take the words of a 90 year old for gospel, because our society prescribes maturity to age and not to conduct and character, which is incorrect. Alexander the Great was 20 years old when he Conquered the known world.

    Our society also tends to prescribe weight to those of monetary means rather than to those of extraordinary thought. We have put value on money above the value of character, hence people try at all costs to get money, even taking shortcuts or from widows and orphans just so they can be elevated in social class. We all know the story of the family event that doesn’t start until a man of means arrives. Then you are subjected to speeches and you need to clap otherwise no money is coming out, it happens all too often in various settings, a rich Mans jokes are always funny they say.

    Life is also strange because a few can rule over the many. The many seem to revere the few, not knowing the instrinct power in their numbers. The few have invested a lot in being able to govern the many. The top minds in the world have come up with solutions to almost every problem, even to the very last synapse in a human brain. If it was a movie it would be The Matrix, not many can unplug themselves, because unplugging needs a small sacrifice and it also puts the machines on alert.⛓️🚨

    Life is also strange because a lot of plans and dreams are in the graveyard. A lot of people have left it too late, they have made all sorts of plans and only they come to fruition would they enjoy themselves. This is because of the brain washing TV and media has had; you must look a certain way, speak a certain way, drive a certain car, marry a certain woman or husband, dress a certain way, live in a certain area, have certain friends…it’s all fleeting really and newer generations have found themselves poorer than older generations, because life and expectations were simpler then and people could rise above hardship because of a strict upbringing.

    Live for the moment, try and enjoy the cards you have been dealt, for you only have one life, find happiness in the fact that today you woke up and got out of bed, while someone may not be so lucky. Find beauty in nature, camaraderie, each other and anything you may find pleasure in regardless of what anyone thinks of you.

    Love God and Love yourself.✊

    #ChangeWorld🌍

    Reply
  5. MYST🀄

    The fear of humiliation is probably worse than the humiliation itself, because it’s self imagined.

    Leaders must be fearless, and leaders must know that uplifting other leaders guarantees immortality. It’s easier to suppressed others, on the other hand uplifting requires an almost God like divinity, it for a select few throughout history and everyone has a chance to change the narrative on their legacy.

    A selfless act will be etched in stone for eternity and songs will be sung in your honour.

    The problem with fear is that, you make you own worst fears come true, it’s self defeating. It’s a spirit, but it is not of God, it is of the underworld.

    As the commandos say, no mission is impossible until one drops dead. Let fear go countrymen let another spirit lead you.🇿🇼🙏

    Reply
  6. MYST🀄

    Farmers are among the worst hit by taxes. Farmers have to pay for production, marketing and transport costs to a market while selling their produce at wholesale prices that they do not control. In other nations, farmers receive subsidies and tax reprieve, showing how important they are in an economy. Some even go as far as restricting the importation of certain produce like grapes 🍇 and apples to protect their farmers from outside competition and dumping🚜

    A farmer is a special kind of person, they have to be a manager, a chemist, know physics and geopgraphy, know IT, be in good physical shape, a builder, a mechanic, a medic, a book keeper, a black smith, a welder, a financial analyst, a reader, a writer, a risk taker and an employer all in one person.

    A farmer has to pay for implements and supplies in advance, in the hope that when they sell their produce they get a return on investment. All at the mercy of an invisible market and the elements out of their control. A special breed of human, one which the Romans called upon to bare arms in their legions when required.

    When compared with our peers Kenya, we lay behind in agriculture, tourism and to a large extent IT. They send more flowers to Europe than we do, it really helps to have a national airline as a going concern. There is a lady, I forget her name, she comes frequently to share genetics, I remember buying a Haas Avocado tree from her, and the Wambugu Apple, which has story I might add, look her up, I think her name is Kate there is a local WhatsApp group, you can probably get more details on her Facebook page or website, just search Wambugu Apple🇿🇼🇰🇪🍎

    They have a plan and they are doing what works for them, a simple glance at their yields and production levels shows how we much we need to catch up in a short space of time, doable📈📊

    Master’s Thesis in Human Geography, 30 credits
    Supervisor: Peter Kinlund
    Department of Human Geography, Stockholm University
    http://www.humangeo.su.se

    Small scale farmers’ access to and
    participation in markets
    – The case of the P4P program in western Kenya

    Maja Skjöldevald

    To be able to feed yourself and one’s family is one of the most basic human rights that exist,
    but it’s still a dream for many. Numerous of the world’s poor people are today relying on
    small scale agriculture based in rural areas for their own and their family’s livelihoods.1
    Knowing this, attempts to reduce poverty and increase development have engaged in
    improving the opportunities for small scale farmers globally. While some of these farmers are
    self sustaining and manage to uphold their livelihood and food security on their own, others
    are relying on access to markets at a local-, regional-, national- or global level. Among
    researchers there is an increasing understanding for the notion that the prospect of small scale
    farmers to get higher revenue on their agricultural produce is connected to their ability to
    successfully competing at markets. As a result, researchers, donor agencies and international
    institutions are today to some extent also focusing on farmers’ access to and participation in
    markets.2 Feeding the rural poor has become one of the key development priorities of the 21st
    century. The World Food Programme (WFP) is the largest organisation that provides food aid
    globally and the amount of money they spend on buying food has tenfold since the 1990s. The
    food that is bought for the purpose of food aid is to a larger extent procured in developing
    countries and WFP has further, in line with the development agenda, started to develop the
    opportunity of purchasing agricultural produce from small scale farmers and traders to
    increase their income and livelihoods and connecting them to the formal market structures.3
    In 2008 WFP launched a five year (2008-2013) pilot project called Purchase for Progress
    (P4P) which takes advantage of WFP’s demand to procure food to be utilised in food aid. By
    buying the agricultural produce from small scale farmers locally WFP anticipate that the
    supply chain will reform and change to be more beneficiary and create structures were small
    scale farmers get improved access to markets that will give them better price for their crops.4
    The P4P program has been started up in 21 different countries, 15 of those in the African
    continent, whereas one of them is in Kenya.5 In Kenya the focus is on organising small scale
    farmers so that they learn from each other’s experiences and increase production and yields,
    create possibilities to bulk crops, improve quality, and take advantage of the structures that
    are built. During the program WFP will be the main buyer of agricultural produce, but areas
    with high capacity farmers groups the plan is that farmers’ organisations (FO) will soon be
    introduced to the competitive market, whereas not so successful FO are to focus on livelihood
    diversification and the use of more drought-resistant crops. At the end of the P4P program,
    WFP expects small scale farmers to move from the informal market to the formal, and earning
    higher revenues for their produce.6
    The WFP are, among other things, collaborating with local non-governmental organisations
    (NGO) in Kenya that in some way are connected to the FO that are participating in the P4P
    program. One of those NGO:s is the Academic Model Providing Access to Healthcare (AMPATH) located in the town of Eldoret in western Kenya that started their partnership
    with WFP and got involved with the P4P program in 2009. AMPATH has for a long time
    helped people in Kenya living with human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), but also work in
    collaboration with WFP to support feeding programs, activities towards livelihood and food
    security to help those that suffers from the consequences of a HIV infection.7 Early on staff at
    AMPATH realised that some patients stopped taking their HIV treatment drugs and so they
    asked them why. The answer they got was that the patients had been told to take their drugs
    with food, and when they didn’t have any food they also didn’t take their drugs. Through this
    they learned that they also needed to focus on their patients’ livelihoods as well as treating
    their HIV infection. It’s important when someone have a positive HIV status to be able to
    support itself, have a livelihood and to be food secure if you are to live with the disease.8
    AMPATH’s partnership with P4P is primarily focused on helping FO:s in the bargaining
    situation and negotiating fair prices but also with capacity building, support and connecting
    FO:s to the formal market. In the long run AMPATH hopes that this will benefit household
    suffering the negative effects of HIV.9
    In this study I will describe small scale farmers’ situation in their efforts to access and
    participate in the formal maize market in western Kenya utilising the case of the P4P
    program. Researchers have described small scale farmers’ difficulties to access to and
    participation in markets in Africa in general. But usually most of this research has been done
    in a context where farmers are producing and selling cash crops (like fruits and vegetables),
    animal products or livestock. In the case of Kenya most of the research is about small scale
    farmers whom are producing and selling fruits.10 Other studies concerns contract farming,
    where the producer is connected to a large super market or any other big scale actor down the
    supply chain.11 Nevertheless most studies relating to small scale farmers’ access and
    participation in markets are predominantly focused on cash crops or high value produce, and
    as mentioned before especially horticulture crops. Few studies have been done in the context
    of staple foods like the ones included in the P4P program (sorghum, maize, corn-soya blend
    and mixed pulses).12 The phenomenon where a large international institution, like WFP,
    procures food from small scale farmers in developing countries to be utilised in food aid
    distribution is something relatively new, and therefore not extensively researched.13 This is
    why the study presented in this thesis tries to describe the dynamics of the formal and
    informal maize market in Kenya, and small scale farmers’ limits and possibilities to access
    and participate in it. I also try to portray the farmers subjective experiences and describe what
    has changed for them since joining the P4P program, and what difficulties they had before
    and what they are facing now.

    6. Conclusions
    The first purpose of this thesis was to portray the dynamics of food markets in developing
    countries, utilising the case of the P4P program in Kenya, and showing what limitations and opportunities there are for small scale farmers. In general are these food markets flawed and
    lacking in infrastructure, market information, bank credit and services, which is also the case
    of the Kenyan maize market. The dynamics of this market are even more complicated by the
    fact that it’s made up of two different marketing channels. One is govern by the state and the
    other by private actors, and the two are intertwined with one another. The market is also
    characterised by informal and formal market structures that also are connected to each other
    along the maize supply chain, and further it’s fragmented because of the shifting population
    density in Kenya. Maize supply chains are becoming more sophisticated and as a result of
    globalisation small scale farmers are also expected to compete at international food markets.
    The Kenyan maize market is in a transformation where it’s going through a liberalisation
    process were private trade has become legal within the structures of state governed maize
    market. Even though the NCPB’s intent has been to ensure that farmers get a fair price on
    their produce and at the same time keeping the prices low enough for consumers, has this
    together with the characteristics of the market created a maize market that is overly
    complicated, inefficient and exploitative towards small scale farmers. There is much debate
    about what role the state is suppose to have within food markets, as in the case of the maize
    market in Kenya. I am convinced that the state has an important role within the development
    of the maize market and increasing the possibility for small scale farmers to be able to access
    and participate in markets. But in the end this discussion comes down to ideology and
    therefore it’s unlikely that researchers, NGO:s, donor agencies and the leaders of the world
    will agree on the way forward.
    The primary purpose of this thesis was to understand how small scale farmers try to navigate
    the market to be able to access and participate in the formal maize market to be able to
    improve their revenue and livelihood. With the help of collective action in the form of FO:s
    the small scale farmers have been able to overcome many limitations of the maize market as
    they for instance share transportation costs and the possibility to bulk maize to attract large
    scale buyers. Further has the capacity building and training that the farmers have received
    since getting involved with the P4P program helped them to increase their yields and limit the
    post harvest losses. Also utilising the forward contract as a security to access bank credit has
    enabled the farmers to invest in their agriculture. The contract is also a guarantee for the
    farmers to get a good price on their produce no matter what happens with the prices at the
    maize market, a way to manage risks. But one of the primary changes that the farmers has
    been trough is their change in mind set from viewing agriculture as something of a hobby to a
    business. This is the foundation for the farmers to become successful in navigating the
    Kenyan maize market. This together, with all the other changes that the P4P program has
    brought on the farmers, has made them become more empowered and affected their power
    relationship towards buyers within the maize supply chain, especially in the bargaining
    situation. Even in the farmers relationships towards WFP they are renegotiating the price on
    the maize which shows that the participants of the P4P program has become more confident
    about the quality on the maize that they are marketing and what price they can expect to get
    for their maize. This has made the middlemen to stop approaching the small scale farmers
    involved in the P4P program, and they have been cut out of the maize supply chain. To some
    extent has even the farmers started to buy maize from other farmers and taken the position of
    the middleman.
    This change in the farmers’ mind set and their improved power position along the maize
    supply chain has also had the effect that the farmers are defaulting on their contracts because
    they, among other things, are finding buyers that are able to top the price that WFP is offering
    them. But since WFP are the once that has trained the farmers to access and participate in the formal market and when they now are doing so, although at the expense of the forward
    contract, WFP can’t really blame the farmers for doing it. One of the major criticisms directed
    towards the P4P program and WFP has to do with the delays in payments because of the
    bureaucracy within WFP organisation. It’s important to point out that the farmers has gone
    from a relatively simple system where the farmer got paid in cash on the spot when the maize
    was uplifted at their farm gate by a middleman, to a system that is more intricate and pays the
    farmer several weeks after the food has been uplifted and it also must meet a certain level of
    standard. This means that the maize might get rejected because it’s lacking in quality. The
    delays in payments risks farmers not being able to pay school fees on times or loans that the
    farmer possibly have. Not having cash when others not involved in the P4P program have
    been paid for their produce may also result in social stigma. But from a buyer’s perspective is
    the staple food market more risk full due to the large amount of buyers in it, which in turn
    makes it difficult to create vertical relations along the supply chain. In the case of the P4P
    program this type of relationship between actors is created on the basis of a forward contract.
    But the lack of vertical relationships along the maize supply chain may also be one of the
    explanations as to why members of the FO:s chose to default their contracts.
    In regard to the small scale farmers own subjective experience of the P4P program they all
    expressed gratefulness for the positive outcomes from the program. The farmers feel more
    empowered and have been able to invest in their agricultural production and increasing their
    yields. Further they have besides their maize production primarily chosen to invest in their
    children’s education, which shows that the positive outcomes not only affect the farmers
    personally but also their family members. They have also chosen to invest in non-farm related
    work like sewing machines and motor bikes as a way to diversifying their income so if their
    farming would fail one season they can rely on other sources of income as well. This is a way
    for the farmers to manage risks. Some FO:s have been more successful than others within the
    framework of the P4P program which, among other things, is a reflection of the barriers
    within the program itself. To be successful within the P4P program the members of the FO:s
    have to be able to master the skills of book keeping and following the agreements of a
    contract, among other things, in addition to overcome the obstacles of the formal market.
    Further the activities of the P4P program have been limited to those that are members of the
    FO:s and their closest family making the spread of the program not very wide. At the same
    time WFP is trying to limit their influence on the market price by not offering the farmers
    higher prices for their procurement of maize, this not to inflate the prices at the maize market.
    Even though the purpose of P4P program’s activities is to increase the revenues of the food
    production for small scale farmers and improve their livelihoods, the program can’t give any
    guarantees that its activities will secure food security for its participants.
    The members of the FO:s and staff at AMPATH and WFP feel proud about their
    accomplishments within the framework of the P4P program and the positive effects it has had
    for the small scale farmers involved in it and the contributions it has given the people the food
    aid has helped in times of distress. The small scale farmers have assisted fellow countrymen
    and contributed to the development end economic growth of their home country. Procuring
    food for the purpose of food aid, as in the case of the P4P program, from small scale farmers
    has achieved a reformation of the geography of the maize supply chain and the power
    relationship between buyer and supplier, although limited to the FO:s involved in the
    program. Along with this the socio-economic conditions has improved for most members of
    the FO:s that are able to overcome the barriers of the P4P program itself. To be able to help
    people in need of food aid and at the same time improve the livelihood of other marginalised
    groups of people when procuring that food from small scale farmers, are probably going to be

    the new food aid procurement paradigm for international organisation and donor agencies in
    the future. Indeed, the P4P program has offered its participants an opportunity to overcoming
    barriers within the formal food market by bringing together small scale farmers with a reliable
    buyer (WFP) and reduce the risks for the food supplier.
    This thesis has, according to me, portrayed the dynamics of the Kenyan maize market and
    how it operates and how this in turn has affected small scale maize farmers in western Kenya.
    It has shown what limitation and barriers that these farmers face and must overcome to be
    able to benefit from the opportunities that the formal maize market has to offer. Further it
    shows how farmers have tried to navigate the market and struggled to get a fair price on their
    maize when selling it to middlemen. Also it describes how the supply chain has changed in
    regard to transforming from trading maize at the informal market to the formal one and how
    the power relationships among actors has changed along it since the involvement in the P4P
    program. In the thesis I have also explained the prospects of collective action and coming
    together in FO:s, but it also describes the limitations of such structures. The thesis also
    contributes with a description and discussion of the rather new phenomenon where food is
    procured locally for the purpose of food aid, like in the case of the P4P program. Relatively
    little has been researched about this topic and with this study I hope that I have contributed to
    extend the knowledge about this topic, and what effects it has on the market and primarily for
    the small scale farmers that are involved in the program. The case of the P4P program is much
    context oriented, meaning that it’s only valid and limited to the time and place when the
    fieldwork in Kenya was conducted. Therefore one thesis most primary contributions of this
    thesis are the small scale farmers own subjective experience of being involved in the P4P
    program. But still the case of the P4P program has also been put in a larger context trying to
    portray how small scale farmers in developing countries are struggling to access and
    participate in formal food markets in general and that this case contributes to this knowledge.

    Reply
  7. The Empress

    The govt got greedy if they had just levied a very light tax. A fraction of half a % would have been OK. The government saw the goose that laid golden eggs and instead of being patient they decided to cut it open.

    Reply
  8. MYST🀄

    Asked to Write a Screenplay, ChatGPT Started Procrastinating and Making Excuses

    https://futurism.com/screenplay-chatgpt-procrastinated

    There is hope for AI afterall, that’s a writer there, writes when she wants.

    Reply
  9. MYST🀄

    Dr Chris van Tulleken: ‘It’s strange to have a clone of yourself in the world’

    https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2024/dec/21/dr-chris-van-tulleken-its-strange-to-have-a-clone-of-yourself-in-the-world

    Reply
  10. MYST🀄

    Rethinking Global Governance: Cooperation in a World of Power
    Joseph E. Stiglitz and Dani Rodrik1
    June 2024
    We live in a highly integrated, highly interdependent world. Climate change affects all of us; carbon
    emissions in one country can have devastating global effects. Viruses know no international borders. For
    more than two hundred years, a basic lesson of economics has been that lowering trade barriers
    contributes to high standards of living by allowing for greater specialization and taking advantage of
    comparative advantage. Knowledge produced in one country can be of benefit to the whole world.2
    While all these areas and many others demand global governance, the reality is that we live in a world
    with limited global cooperation. Policies are determined by domestic politicians, based on “national
    interest.” The nation state remains the principal locus of political accountability. Moreover, some types
    of global governance can backfire when they privilege powerful countries (or special interests within
    them) instead of addressing common challenges. These and other considerations we discuss below
    imply that we should not be too demanding of global institutions Taking into account political realities, a
    more circumscribed, less ambitious global agenda may be preferable. We advance here a framework for
    a minimal global governance architecture.
    In what follows, we first outline some general principles that should govern the design of global
    governance and provide their justification. The next section discusses the reasons, both positive and
    normative, for our minimal conception of global governance. In the remaining sections of the paper, we
    draw the implications of these ideas in a variety of arenas: IPR, trade, financial flows, monetary policy,
    investment agreements, management of debt. Our principles help guide us to areas where we should be
    hopeful of the possibility of good agreements (green lighted), areas where such agreements should be

    widely circumscribed (red lighted), and areas where we should proceed with extreme caution (yellow
    lighted).
    I. Four general principles3
    A minimalist global governance architecture should be based on the following principles.
    First, international rules should generally allow countries to do as they please so long as they do not
    engage in explicitly beggar-thy-neighbor (BTN) policies or, in the case of systemically-large countries,
    impose significant costs on poorer countries. It is remarkable how many provisions of global agreements
    violate this principle: typically, the behavior of small developing countries has no impact on the global
    economy, yet this is an arena in which international agreements have had perhaps the most binding
    effects—precisely because the countries are small and powerless. Countries may engage in actions
    which the wisdom in the West suggests are foolish, but they bear the consequences. It would be
    impractical for global governance arrangements to discipline all national policies that produce cross-
    border spillovers. The list of such policies can be very long, including many domestic regulations,
    investment policies, or social policies.
    Hence our first principle restricts the presumption of international discipline, for most countries, to
    policies that have a specifically beggar-thy-neighbor nature. BTN policies are defined as those that
    provide benefits at home only to the extent that they impose costs on foreign countries. They are
    policies whose benefits are the direct and intended result of that harm. Applying import tariffs or export
    restrictions to extract monopoly rents from other countries, competitive devaluations under conditions
    of unemployment, or paper-profit shifting through tax havens are some examples. BTNs are only a
    subset of policies that produce cross-border spillovers.
    But countries whose policies have a disproportionate effect on the global monetary, financial, regulatory,
    or trade context should face a higher degree of accountability and responsibility, and ideally this should
    be so even under a “minimalist” global architecture. However, the very arguments entailing political
    realism that force us to focus on this minimalist vision suggest that such accountability is unlikely to
    occur. As we discuss further below, these systematically-important countries would ideally have to

    accept some global oversight over policies that have significant and adverse effects on the economic
    prospects of lesser developed nations.
    Within countries, we regulate actions that harm others, whether the benefits of those actions are the
    direct and intended result of that harm. Intentions play no role; it is only the effects of actions that
    matter. A more expansive global governance would attempt to address externalities more generally.
    Today, at least in one arena, this more expansive view is necessary: the intent of those using fossil fuels is
    to lower their energy costs; the climate change, harming everyone everywhere, is the unintended
    consequence. But their lowered cost of energy comes, of course, at the expense of the wellbeing of
    everyone in the planet.
    A second principle is that there are marked variations among countries, so that any international
    agreement has to reflect these differences in circumstances. These differences may arise from different
    national preferences, historical trajectories, or economic conditions (such as levels of income). If we
    think of national regulations or standards as reflecting the provision of public goods, countries differ in
    their ideals with regard to the type of such public goods. Financial regulations, for example, may entail a
    tradeoff between promoting financial innovation and securing financial stability. When countries have
    different views about which point to select on the “optimum frontier,” global harmonization of financial
    regulations may be sub-optimal. Similarly, different nations will put different weights on the contending
    goals of privacy, convenience, and innovation when regulating new technologies such as AI. We will
    emphasize below that an intellectual property framework that is appropriate for the U.S., at the frontier
    of innovation, is not likely well designed for a developing country.
    A third general principle is that global agreements should be consistent not only with global efficiency,
    but also with global fairness. A focus on global public goods and the avoidance of beggar-thy-neighbor,
    with due regard to differences across countries, is not enough. Addressing climate change or global
    health, for example, requires significant resources. Poorer nations should not be asked to pay for more
    than their fair share – especially, as in the case of carbon, it is the advanced economies that are
    responsible for the bulk of the historical emissions. In both cases, the standard of global fairness would
    require significant resource and technology transfers from the North to the South.
    By the same token, policies in large countries such as the U.S., can have significant adverse effects on
    developing countries. A minimal standard of fairness would require that such countries formulate their
    policies with due regard to negative spillovers, especially for poorer nations. This principle also implies

    that developing countries and emerging markets should be wary about signing on to agreements that
    give them a small share of the surplus generated. This is especially so because of the high levels of
    uncertainty associated with the future evolution of the global economy. A small gain can easily be
    turned into a large loss. A tax agreement recently proposed by the OECD illustrates. The developing
    countries were offered a pittance, but in return they would have to give up rights to impose a digital tax,
    as well as other (poorly defined) “unilateral measures.” Some countries signed on, thinking that
    something (some revenues) is better than nothing. But almost surely, with the growth of the digital
    economy, what they had agreed to forgo would be of increasing importance. There is a high likelihood
    that (were the OECD agreement ever to come into force, which currently appears unlikely), developing
    countries and emerging markets would actually be worse off, with the gains from the global agreement
    going largely to the advanced countries.
    The final principle to which we want to draw attention is that economic arrangements have broad social
    and political consequences that must be considered. Economics does not stand outside society.
    International economic arrangements can produce redistributive effects across income groups or regions
    that could produce unforeseen consequences. Limitations on the autonomy of national policy makers
    can undermine political accountability and produce a backlash against mainstream political leaders, and
    increase support for right-wing, authoritarian populists. For example, capital market liberalization,
    allowing the free flow of money in and out of a country, has not only large and potentially adverse
    financial and economic consequences, but it also has political consequences. Global agreements affect
    the policy space and democratic governance within a country. Economic arrangements may also shape
    individuals and social arrangements: a society where cooperatives play a more important role may lead
    to more cooperative individuals; neoliberal capitalism with its emphasis on the unwavering pursuit of
    self-interest may generate more selfish people and institutional arrangements which condone such
    behavior.4

    4 This is a central theme of the recent literature on endogenous preferences, and how preferences are shaped by
    society and in turn help shape it. See Karla Hoff and J. E. Stiglitz, “Striving for Balance in Economics: Towards a
    Theory of the Social Determination of Behavior,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Issue 126 (June),
    pp. 25–57; Allison Demeritt, Karla Hoff, and J. E. Stiglitz, The Other Invisible Hand: How Culture Shapes Societies
    and Wellbeing, New York: Columbia University Press, forthcoming. These ideas are in a long tradition. See, in
    particular, Karl Polanyi ,The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time,” New York:
    Ferrar and Straus, 1944 (also Boston: Beacon Press, 2001, with a forward linking his work with globalization, by J. E.
    Stiglitz).

    Reply
  11. MYST🀄

    Happy Birthday Raviro👏

    I was there when she was born, in the theatre, I had to scrub in and the nurses and doctors and Vincent Pallotti let me watch entire caesarian section from start to finish and even take photos.

    Raviro was early she was due in January. It was not an easy pregnancy because my ex wife before had been admitted into ICU. Then we went for a checkup and the doctor said the baby has to come now! her heart beat is very faint. So the appointment turned into an admission..

    I was laughing with the doctor before, making jokes in the hallway. I forget her name, should be Richardson or there about. I knew she had it, so I wasn’t anxious at all. We were in good hands, and because she was relaxed, I was relaxed.

    They cut her out of her mothers belly, and were movies get it wrong, she didn’t cry immediately after. I gave doctor Sinclair our paed a worried look, and he gave me the its all good look, wait.. After a few she was whailing, handshakes job done.. Then she had to go into one of those little incubators, then I had to get back to work because I was on standby, my team took leave in December so I had to be there, but I was happy.

    I thank her mom, she did a hell of a job, I was just a cheerleader the entire time. Nice one sha, we have beautiful children 👍

    Reply
  12. MYST🀄

    In my humble opinion it is not the building of new hospitals and acquisition of new ambulances that is of urgent concern for public health .. Of course for voters and those that want to win you have to show deliverables, like look here its a new hospital, or look at this parking lot full of Ambulances.

    What is probably more urgent is the 1. Remuneration of health workers and their conditions of service.
    2. The stocking and equipping of current health facilities.
    3. The refurbishment and upgrade of current health facilities.
    4. Research & development, manufacture of local pharmaceuticals.

    If these 4 things are done well, a regime is probably capable of forecasting population growth and density for the design and construction of new health facilities and manufacture of local vehicles that can be modified into Ambulances.

    Reply
  13. MYST🀄

    I can understand why some corporations and people seek tax havens, some taxation is just borderline anti-trust, if I can use that term. Why not be the tax haven for example? 🇿🇼 What? You are powerless?, Your masters won’t let you, sorry.

    Taxation of Multinational Corporations
    An important aspect of globalization is multinational corporations operating in multiple countries.
    Ascertaining how taxing rights should be allocated has been vexing—the corporations strive to ensure
    that their income is attributed to jurisdictions with low tax rates. The system that has been in place for a
    century, the transfer price system, has proven itself particularly inadequate for the new digital
    technologies; but the deficiencies those exposed turn out to be far broader. The so-called transfer price
    system attempts to allocate profits to where the income arises, by pretending that there are “arms
    length prices” at each stage of production. Because such prices don’t in fact exist, there is enormous
    scope for making up prices. By making up prices, profits can be shifted—say to a tax haven like Panama.
    The abuses of the system are legion. For example, all of Apple’s profits in Europe originate from a few
    employees in Ireland.

    As the world sank into the Great Recession, the need for more tax revenues became urgent, and the
    diversion of profits to the tax havens became increasingly irksome. Moreover, the digital giants appeared
    to be among those escaping paying their fair share of taxes—and a good and easy source of revenues.
    Thus, began the initiative within the OECD for improving the global tax regime, called BEPS—base erosion and profit shifting. It has two pillars—one ensuring firms pay a minimum tax (15%, lowered
    through exceptions and exemptions, to something more like 12 to 13%, less than half the rate of taxation
    in Latin America), and the other allocating tax rights, but only for the largest firms, and only for a small
    portion of their profits, on a basis unjustified in any way, including by any coherent economic theory. In
    return, countries would have to forego imposing what were called unilateral measures, like digital taxes.
    The revenues that most developing countries could expect was miniscule, and when offset by the
    potential for growing digital taxes, almost surely negative for many developing countries. What had
    begun as an initiative to raise more revenues for developing countries, ensure that the multinationals
    pay their fair share of taxes, and simplify the taxation of multinational taxation had seemingly failed on
    all accounts, except one: guaranteeing that multinationals pay at least a (very low) minimal tax.
    The OECD claimed it as an important first step, one which would eventually generate the desired results.
    But a more realistic way of looking at what happened is that American and European multinationals, and
    especially the digital giants, had gotten their way—in return for a minimal tax (which they would, in any
    case, would eventually have had to pay), and the potential of a small additional tax on a small portion of
    their income, they would be protected against additional taxation such as digital taxes.
    There are many lessons. First, an important one in terms of global governance: the locus of global
    decision making needs to be in a venue where the voice of the developing countries and emerging
    markets is stronger than it is in the OECD, the club of the advanced countries. In this case, the G-24, a
    grouping of developing countries, put forward a coherent set of reform proposals, which was almost
    totally ignored in favor of those put forward by the advanced countries.
    Second, a minimalist agenda, focusing on setting a minimum tax rate, the most egregious forms of base
    erosion, curtailing tax havens, reforming the double tax regime, and preserving rights to taxation may
    lead to a better global tax regime than a more ambitious agenda, such as that undertaken by the OECD.

    Reply
  14. MYST🀄

    A tax I am yet to understand fully is PAYE. It is almost like a punishment for working in the formal sector.. How about we keep it to a single digit % and how about Civil Servants not pay
    payroll a taxes at all, because they are providing a service after all.. Industry should be our focus, that’s were a lot of government income can
    and com probably should come from.

    Reply
  15. MYST🀄

    Some of the investors we bring out the red carpet and band for wont even be invited to the end of year dinner in their respective countries. The irony, they even laugh about it to their mates. Yeah! they brought out the band and everything it was hilarious, I was treated like a king. Are they that desperate Josh? I don’t know Kai as long as I get my money.

    Investment Agreements
    Investment agreements began as a seemingly innocuous effort to protect investors against expropriation.
    The reality was otherwise: investors could buy insurance against expropriation at low cost (through a
    branch of the World Bank Group and national insurers), and expropriations had become, in any case,
    rate by the time the investment agreements started to proliferate.

    In practice, the agreements gave foreign investors more rights than domestic investors, protected
    investors against changes in regulations and taxes, and compensated them exorbitantly for any losses they might have incurred. Moreover, disputes were settled through a process of investor-state dispute
    settlement (ISDS) that involved highly paid private arbitrators, not subject to modern standards, e.g.
    concerning conflicts of interest and transparency, and without a framework of appeal. By 2016, even the
    US was complaining—as the agreements started to be used against it; and the critical difference
    between NAFTA and the US-Mexico-Canada agreement that succeeded it was the elimination (for the
    most part) of the ISDS provisions. Within Europe, too, there has been a move against these agreements,
    as it has become clear that they are likely to be a big obstacle to the green transition.

    Investment agreements are a clear manifestation of the power of powerful companies to advance their
    interests over that of the wellbeing of society more generally. Though it now appears unlikely that any
    new agreements will be signed, there is a legacy of a multitude of such agreements; a minimalist global
    architecture would work to terminate these agreements.

    Reply
  16. MYST🀄

    Debt
    Debt has always been a problem for the poor and for poor countries, but in the aftermath of the
    Pandemic and the War in Ukraine, and the post pandemic inflation, it is becoming a critical problem. A
    large number of countries are in debt distress, and a few have gone over the brink. There is no
    international framework for resolving sovereign debt problems. There is nothing akin to the bankruptcy
    procedures that help overindebted individuals and corporations within each country restructure their
    debts—procedures which help protect households and jobs, and incentivize lenders from pushing
    excessive indebtedness.
    It is not for lack of good ideas. The UN General Assembly overwhelmingly approved the idea for the
    creation of such a framework in 2014, and followed this with a set of principles, again overwhelming
    endorsed by the General Assembly in 2015. The only problem was that a few key creditors (US and UK)
    voted against, and nothing happened.
    The G-20 has recognized the problematic nature of current arrangements. In the beginning of the
    pandemic, it created the Debt Sustainability Initiative (DSI) to allow for suspension of debt payments for
    those in most distress. The arrangement proved ineffective, with private sector creditors refusing to
    participate, and debtors being reluctant to ask for debt suspension, lest it lead to a credit rating
    downgrade. Recognizing these limitations, this initiative was followed by the Global Sovereign Debt
    Roundtable, which seems equally ineffective. Most importantly, many countries don’t just need a
    suspension of debt servicing; they need, depending on one’s perspective on growth prospects, either
    greater access to liquidity or debt restructuring, often deep. There is a large literature showing that the
    cost of delay—“too late, too late”—can be enormous.10
    Clearly, the minimalist architecture we have is too little—debt negotiations become a power game, in
    which the powerful financial interests overcome others. Too little of a rule of law results in a law of the
    jungle. Whether an international bankruptcy court of the kind recommended by the UN Commission

    10 See, e.g. Martin Guzman, J.A. Ocampo, and J. E. Stiglitz (eds.)Too Little, Too Late: The Quest to Resolve Sovereign
    Debt Crises, Initiative for Policy Dialogue at Columbia, New York: Columbia University Press, 2016.

    Reply
  17. MYST🀄

    But, whatever the accuracy of these numbers, these targets do not
    act as policy triggers if the outcome differs from the targets. If per-
    formance is reasonably in line with the announced figures, govern-
    ments congratulate themselves. But if the outcome falls short of the
    “target,” there is no presumption that policy action will be taken to
    correct the situation. Instead, there may be explanations: the dollar
    depreciated more than expected, the winter was excessively severe,
    etc.; and there may be the announcement of more pleasing “targets”
    for the next year or the next quarter. Two recent instances of this “jam
    tomorrow” approach, both relating to the United States, may be
    recalled.13
    Early in 1986, a disappointing growth rate for the last
    quarter of 1985 was reported (1.2 percent, about half of the earlier
    estimate); the administration announced at the same time a robust
    4 percent growth target for 1986.14
    Half a year later, this target was
    acknowledged as unrealistic (the outcome proved to be 2.2 percent),
    but again the pill was sweetened by a simultaneous release of an
    estimate for 1987 growth at 4.5 percent.15
    The abandonment of operationally meaningful growth targets for
    the economy should not be seen—as it probably would have been
    seen 10 or 15 years ago—as a dereliction by governments of their
    responsibilities. It reflects, rather, a new and chastened view on how
    growth can be promoted over the long term. The new philosophy was
    clearly expressed in a December 1985 programmatic paper by the
    German Federal Ministry of Finance: “In an economic system based
    on free enterprise, economic growth is not so much the aim as the
    result of market processes. The task of the public sector is not to
    realize the highest possible growth rates at the cost of unwarrantable fiscal policy measures, but to ensure that economic activity can de-
    velop unhindered and is provided with sufficient incentive. The price
    signals transmitted by the market must reach the recipients . . . with
    as little distortion as possible. Sound public finances will increase the
    confidence of markets in the dependability of policies. Well-ordered
    public budgets are thus an important basis for long-term decisions
    . . . and part of the foundation of an efficient free-market system.”16
    Similar views on the issue of the most effective policy for economic
    growth can be found in other industrial countries.17
    Indeed, the extent
    to which official opinion in general has moved away from the growth
    activism of earlier decades can be inferred from the radical change in
    evaluation of the concept of “fine tuning” of the economy: in the 1960s
    and 1970s, it conveyed the notion of the consummate skill of eco-
    nomic policymakers; in the 1980s, “fine tuning” stands for a new
    taboo which (like any generally respected taboo) needs no further
    explanation.

    13 the Queen said: “The rule is, jam tomorrow and jam yesterday — but never jam
    today.” Carroll (1871).

    14 New York Times, February 21, 1986.

    15 New York Times, July 25, 1986. The outcome for 1987 was 4.0 percent.

    …

    Reply
  18. MYST🀄

    Structural Policy
    This is the place to devote some attention to “structural policy,” or
    “micro-policy,” that did not rank in the major league of economic
    (macro) policies before the 1980s, but that has since acquired that
    status.23
    Under optimistic assumptions, structural policy could (oper-
    ating from the supply side) be expected to fill, in part, the voids left by
    the disappearance of incomes policy and the retreat of fiscal policy on
    the demand side.
    When conservative governments came into power in Britain, the
    United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, and France, each
    announced as a major component of its platform a reduction of the
    role of the government in the private economy of the country,
    through such measures as deregulation and privatization.
    In principle, such policies could have had a major impact on the
    performance of the major economies—by increasing competition,
    lowering costs, reducing the share of government in GNP, and raising
    efficiency and thus economic growth. Indeed, “structural reform” (or
    action against Eurosclerosis) has often been put forward as the preferred alternative to fiscal stimulation to bring about higher growth
    rates in Europe. In Germany in particular, where fiscal and monetary
    conditions have become less stringent in the last year and real in-
    comes have benefited from improvements of the terms of trade, the
    scope for increased consumption and investment as inhibiting restric-
    tions are relaxed could be substantial.
    In practice, however, the results of the new policy stance have
    generally been unimpressive. In the United States, the zeal for regula-
    tory reform soon faded as reform of social regulations in particular
    met too many political impediments.24
    Financial deregulation, which
    had started under the Carter Administration, is still in an uncertain
    state.25
    In the Federal Republic of Germany, too, only little progress was
    made on deregulation and, contrary to the authorities’ announced
    intentions, subsidy payments continue to increase. Some progress
    was, however, made in labor market legislation in 1984-86, which
    reduced the trade unions’ bargaining power in labor disputes, facili-
    tated the hiring of youths and part-time workers, and increased the
    flexibility of labor contracts. In France, the new approach is perhaps
    still too young to permit any assessment. Only in the United Kingdom
    has there been a sharp change in the business climate. The power of
    trade unions, which exceeded that in most other countries, has been
    radically curbed; this has facilitated large-scale labor shedding and
    raised unemployment, but it has not put an end to the upward
    pressure of wages of the employed. Privatization of large state-owned
    enterprises has significantly reduced the government’s role in busi-
    ness, and continues to help the public sector borrowing requirement.
    The elimination of exchange control and the Big Bang recasting of
    the London financial markets have been instrumental in consolidating
    London’s position as the major European financial center.

    Reply
  19. MYST🀄

    Monetary Policy
    Monetary policy has become the preferred instrument in many
    countries since 1979, in the hope that the prescription of a certain
    growth rate for some monetary aggregate would bring about the same
    growth rate for nominal GDP. (A weaker version of the same hope
    was that control over a suitable monetary aggregate would provide the much-needed “nominal anchor” that would keep inflation down
    to a few percentage points below the growth of that aggregate.) Note
    that under this approach monetary policy was being assigned to a
    domestic task, the control over GDP, no doubt in recognition of the
    fact that the earlier expectations for the performance of this task by
    fiscal policy had been disappointed. However, one instrument cannot
    serve two purposes; the consequence was that monetary policy was
    not available to regulate the balance of payments. Thus, the only
    exchange rate regime compatible with this approach was free floating.
    This fitted the mood of the major countries at the time.
    We can perhaps leave it as a moot point whether this approach to
    monetary policy fell out of favor because it proved inefficient to its
    assigned task (owing to unpredictable changes in velocity) or because
    of disenchantment with leaving the exchange market as the residual
    of policies in other areas. Thus, without much fanfare, monetary
    policy in recent years has, to an important extent, been reassigned to
    the international task of keeping exchange rate movements within
    acceptable (or unavoidable) limits; that is to say, it has become, to a
    smaller or larger degree, depending on the country, the instrument to
    achieve the objectives of exchange rate policy.
    There is little doubt that this is a task that monetary policy can
    normally perform. Moreover, if considerable freedom is allowed to
    exchange rates (as, for example, under the target zone system with
    wide bands), monetary policy should frequently be able to take time
    off from its exchange rate assignment and thus become available to
    help out with the management of domestic demand.26🚛

    Reply
  20. MYST🀄☔

    Exchange Rate Policy
    These observations on monetary policy lead to a comment on the
    role of the exchange rate as a policy instrument. That role needs to be
    differentiated in accordance with the exchange rate regime under
    which countries conduct their international economic policies. In a
    stable rate regime, such as the EMS, changes in the peg are available
    as a policy instrument. They have been used by France (as well as by
    other EMS members) to remove the pressure arising from higher rates
    of inflation than in the Federal Republic of Germany, when that
    pressure began to affect market expectations. But care has been taken,
    especially in the more recent years of the EMS (say, since 1983), not to
    use the exchange rate as too easy an escape valve for inflation by not
    treating the EMS regime as an automatic crawling peg, but instead to
    take advantage of every realignment to bring the aim of convergence on a low inflation rate for the European Community closer to reality.
    In contrast with France, the exchange rate policies of the other
    major countries operated within the parameters of a floating rate
    regime.27
    But within this regime, the policies of other countries were
    constrained by the choice made by the United States.28
    As long as the
    United States followed a hands-off policy on the exchange rate for the
    dollar, there was little that Germany or Japan could do for the dollar/
    DM and the dollar/yen rate respectively—unless they had been pre-
    pared to take the risk of pegging on the dollar. Like the dollar in
    1980-85, sterling in 1980-82 was allowed to be priced on the basis of
    “market forces” (read in this case: U.K. monetary policy), without
    government intervention in the exchange markets. As the damage
    done by the uncontrolled appreciations of their respective currencies
    sank in, first in the United Kingdom and then, in the second half of
    1985, in the United States, exchange rate policy again became an
    option, and this also provided new opportunities for exchange rate
    management in Germany and Japan. Of course, still in a floating rate
    regime, exchange rate management meant management of the ex-
    change rate by means of another policy instrument, primarily mone-
    tary policy. Since expectations on the medium-term strength of the
    dollar hinged importantly on the outlook for control of the budget
    deficit, fiscal policy also acquired a (mostly psychological) role in
    relation to the short-term management of the exchange rate. During
    1987, the exchange rate policy of other countries vis-a-vis the U.S.
    dollar has increasingly begun to resemble the practices in the latter
    years of the par value system, where exchange rate stability became a
    policy objective by itself, supported more strongly by intervention
    and exhortation than by changes in underlying policies. This has led
    to the expansion of monetary aggregates in some other countries
    beyond what would be found desirable from the point of view of
    domestic demand—leading, of course, to some adjustment via this
    route.

    Reply
  21. MYST🀄

    Is Fiscal Policy up to its Task?
    In any system in which exchange rates are not entirely left to market
    forces—including such wide variations of regime from leaning against
    the wind, reference rates, target zones in any of the many versions,
    and “stable but adjustable rates,” up to the gold standard—monetary
    policy must remain available to help achieve or maintain the exchange
    rate objectives of the system. Monetary policy may sometimes be
    available to help out in demand policy; but in some of the most
    difficult moments of an adjustment program its setting may be deter-
    mined by the demands of its exchange rate task. Sometimes, this may
    be helpful to achieve the objectives of demand management, as when
    the exchange rate needs to be defended and demand disinflated. But
    in “conflict situations,” such as may be brought about by a recession
    abroad, the performance of its primary duty by monetary policy may
    add to the burdens of fiscal policy to regulate demand.
    As indicated in the earlier subsection on fiscal policy, such policy in
    most of the main industrial countries can no longer be treated as the
    patient workhorse of economic management, ready to move in one
    direction or the other at a tug at the reins. On the contrary, govern-
    ments have learned the hard lesson that fiscal policy itself needs to be
    treated with a considerable dose of Tender Loving Care in the present
    in order to keep it in good enough health for the uncertain tasks of the
    future.
    While fiscal policy can be assigned the task of influencing nominal
    domestic demand in the desired direction, governments can no longer
    credibly promise (or expect credible promises from their trading
    partners) that moves in the fiscal stance can quickly change the
    demand situation. Also, with short-run changes in fiscal policy now seen as costly in themselves, governments will want to see relatively
    large and/or persistent indications of the need for adjustment before
    changing fiscal course.
    These changes in attitude toward the fiscal instrument could well
    explain at least part of the slowness of the international adjustment
    process in recent years; and to the extent that the attitude reflects
    inherent structural limitations of fiscal policy, intensified attempts at
    international coordination of policy may be more productive in terms of
    understanding of each others’ problems than in removing imbalances.
    Two further considerations need, however, to be adduced to put
    this finding into proper perspective. The first is that the reduced
    flexibility of fiscal policy may in part be temporary. This would be the
    case to the extent that some period of fiscal rigidity may be needed to
    convince the public that the days of fiscal pliancy (upward pliancy, of
    course) are over. The experience of the Federal Reserve with a rigid
    monetary policy after October 1979 is instructive in this connection;
    once the Federal Reserve had for three years running established a
    clear track record of resisting inflationary pressures with whatever
    degree of tightness of the money supply was required, it could relax
    that tightness to meet deflationary pressures in the U.S. (and the
    world) economy without provoking a new outbreak of inflation. Over
    time, a government that has established its fiscal conservatism may
    thereby have gained a useful degree of flexibility in its use of fiscal
    policy for the future. As indicated in the previous subsection on fiscal
    policy, Japan may already have succeeded in overcoming the cycle
    from excessive flexibility via excessive rigidity to workable flexibility.
    The second consideration is that it is very difficult, on the basis of a
    small number of country cases (each of which has, of course, its own
    peculiarities) to determine in an objective way the degree of fiscal
    inflexibility that is needed, first to stamp out the overly optimistic
    expectations of the past and then, on a permanent basis, to preserve
    the integrity of the fiscal tool. Inevitably, the operationally relevant
    opinion presented on this subject—both to the electorate at home and
    to interested governments and institutions abroad—is that of the
    authorities in power in the country concerned. That opinion may well
    represent an inseparable mixture of economic judgment concerning
    the usability of the instrument and political judgment concerning the
    desirability of using it. If the lady does not want to tango, she is nicer
    if she blames a hurting ankle than just says “no.” The outsider may
    find it difficult to discern the true reason; nor would it help him much
    if he could. Even if the potential usability of the instrument could be
    established in an objective way, this might not facilitate much the
    process of international policy coordination: that process requires not
    only the availability of instruments to achieve desired objectives, but
    just as much a unity of view as to what these objectives are.

    Reply
  22. MYST🀄

    For Zimbabwean and African manufacturing firms to compete at an international level, we need to utilise similar or superior technology to what is found in developed countries. Vocational training, good policy, access to cheap financing and uninterrupted cheap electricity also matter. China is currently investing a lot in robotics by getting technology from German firms, its not disallowed to learn from the best and it primes their economies for the next generation activities.

    Africa’s Manufacturing Puzzle: Evidence from
    Tanzanian and Ethiopian Firms
    Xinshen Diao, Mia Ellis, Margaret McMillan, and Dani Rodrik

    6. Conclusion: Implications for Growth and Growth Policy in Low-Income Countries
    The analysis of the manufacturing sectors in Ethiopia and Tanzania reveals a dichotomy between larger
    firms that exhibit superior productivity performance but do not expand employment much, and small
    firms that absorb employment but do not experience much productivity growth. Typically, economic
    development happens when the productively dynamic parts of the economy absorb resources from the
    rest. By contrast, the choice that African manufacturers seem to face is either to increase productivity or
    to increase employment.
    It is unlikely that this pattern can be explained (only) by factor-price distortions or other institutional
    shortcomings specific to the African setting. This study’s interpretation is that the technologies available
    on world markets restrict the range of production techniques that can be used by firms. As the capital-
    (and skill-) intensity of global technology has increased, the gap with low-income countries’ factor en-
    dowments has opened wide. Becoming more productive requires adopting technologies with factor input
    combinations that are increasingly at variance with African countries’ factor abundance.
    From the standpoint of trade theory, this study’s interpretation amounts to an argument that Ethiopia
    and Tanzania have been losing comparative advantage in traditionally labor-intensive manufactures due
    to a trend reduction in their labor intensity. This implies a loss in the gains from trade. It also lowers the
    ceiling on industrialization and constrains the capacity of manufacturing to absorb labor productively.
    This is not to say that manufacturing cannot play an important role in the development of these coun-
    tries. After all, productivity growth in the large manufacturing firms in Tanzania and Ethiopia has been
    impressive and could create jobs indirectly. For example, while the manufacturing of food products is
    capital intensive, smallholder farming is labor intensive. Worker training programs associated with in-
    dustrialization strategies like Ethiopia’s Technical and Vocational Education and Training School (TVET)
    could also enhance the capabilities of smaller firms. And the managerial and logistical capabilities of…..

    Reply
  23. MYST🀄

    Have you even been in a situation were someone sees you as surplus to requirements?. In a relationship were someone thinks you will never leave?. When you leave then they catch feelings and try get at you? A mindset of if we cannot have him no one can. Queue stalker alert. Is this not what you wanted, you should be happy! Usually this happens in the reverse. I am blessed, even the worst things that happen to me do not define me, its just a Monday. I have had to fight from a young age, mi nuh born wit spoon in mi maut. I was not born rich, I had a dream and I worked for it, so if you mock me off being poor, its water off a ducks back, I was raised on a farm compound, you would probably not have had a minute for me if you saw me barefoot with zvigamba.

    All I have left is my wits and skill and my dreams, just like before you met me. Forca!

    #blessed

    Reply
  24. MYST🀄

    The controversy surrounding the play Macbeth was that Shakespeare was accused of using real spells from real witches, like when Hecate says, ‘cauldron bubble’. I think the same was said about the Harry Potter series, perhaps this is why these books resonate with so many. The battle is spiritual more than anything else, when the favour is returned, they cry foul because their life is made for impunity, tazviramba, tinoda kudzoserawo’

    Reply
  25. MYST🀄

    I want tell you about a girl called Ndaji from Zambia😊 . Her nickname was Angel. I met her around 2010, she and her friend FiFi whose nickname was Miss new booty.. Kkkk They used to hang out with us.

    So I asked Ndaji for her number, then when I was going to meet her at Baxter residence I was stopped by the cops. I was walking towards main road drunk.

    Then I heard a voice say Captain, arrest this man. I was like what? What’s going on. It turns out, Rugare (Rugs) boyfriend a South African guy had joined the Police community program. It was a program were anyone could join the Police as a reserve, and you would get a uniform and all but no fire arm, and you get to ride shotgun, I should have done it as well, hindsight.

    Then I saw it was a familiar face, then we started chatting and joking around. I was like gents, I have to go now, I have a mission, maybe 1 or 2 am in the morning.

    Ndaji had a room mate so we hatched a plan to go to the soccer fields.. Not the main UCT soccer fields but field we used to call home ground, because All Stars never lost on that field.

    This field became our base, taingo riska (zvinoitika kuma university uku😅 ). I remember late one evening we were in the middle of the field and a patrol vehicle came past. I was like don’t move!. Surely enough the patrol vehicle, came and went. 🚔 Scoring on and off the field, not a false 9.😜

    Then she needed my help. Then I came through for her, I wonder where she is now. There was another girl from Zambia, I met her at middle campus. We had what was called a special, chips with a hotdog and the best spices for only R10.

    I asked he out for chocolate cake because coffee is arbitrary. Stole that line from a movie, the one with Matt Damon. Then we went to Claremont, Mugg ‘n’ Bean for chocolate cake, then I walked her home.. I flaked on her because I was dating someone else, so I never really pursued anything after that. Then I met her friend in Debonairs. She was like how come you don’t call my friend anymore. I said because I have a girlfriend and she said, so what! I have no regrets because I have three very beautiful children, a small change in your past has repercussion in your future, that’s why time travel is impossible or dangerous.

    #noregrets

    Reply
  26. MYST🀄

    The last couple of days I didn’t get good sleep. The springs on my bed were poking me because I have no mattress and God, I must killed almost more than a dozen.. So
    I devised a plan. I got my K-Way bag with padding then used it as my base. I slept like a baby, the steady drizzle also helped. When I woke up this morning I was in some kind of mood😇😂

    Reply
  27. MYST🀄

    We were still mourning Leonard Dembo when a lad from Kwekwe came to the Chitungwiza Aquatic Complex and did this….

    Tongai Moyo and Utakataka Express – Hurungudo

    He eased our wounds which will never completely heal, why do the best of us leave so early?

    Reply
  28. MYST🀄

    I was thinking the other day, when you are in government its like playing for the Warriors or Chevrons. You are now in the national team. You represent us internationally. You are the embodiment of who we are as a society. We have selected you to represent us as a whole. You are the guardians of our culture, traditions heritage and finances.

    We gave you a mandate to stir not to stir the cauldron.

    Reply
  29. MYST🀄

    There was an MTV series dedicated to fail compilations from YouTube. You can make a TV program from nothing, just other people’s stupidity.

    Reply
  30. MYST🀄

    Guys at pockets hill, we have a request. Just as anyone would come request from a DJ.

    Please could you show the other big 5 on TV so kids know what a Leopard, Rhino, Elephant and Nyathi look like in their habitat.

    Remember the days the Rand had the big 5. I know the R50 was pink and the R200 was rare. A simple design for a currency.

    Reply
  31. DJ Cleo

    Mandoza – Ama 50 pinki

    Reply
  32. MYST🀄

    It perplexes me. National Geo, BBC, Canal+, History Channel et al make documentaries on the big 5 in our own backyard. Actually one of my favourite series is BBC Planet Earth in 1080p of Hostile Planet, have you seen the Jaguar vs Cayman scene?

    It would be nice for us to make our own, don’t you think? It would be nice to have our own voice overs, not Sir David Attenborough or Bear Grylls, but Kapfupi, Chawa, MisRed, KVG or that boy who doesn’t wear underwear. 😄

    Reply
  33. MYST🀄

    Censorship Board

    Memo: 30/12/24

    Please be advised that from 1 January 2025 any image depicting a Leopard, a Black Leopard, a Panther, a Tiger or a Jaguar are banned!🐆

    Please also note the Jolly Roger is banned. ☠️

    Everyone must also wear underwear no one is allowed to go Commando. 👙

    Your cooperation in this matter is sincerely appreciated.

    Director

    Zodwa Wabantu

    Reply
  34. MYST🀄

    Please lighten up, we must be able to joke around together, everything doesn’t have to be a fight. I am your host DJD alongside the most radiant ….

    It is that time again for our end of year awards.

    Some have received the Gold
    Cross of Zimbabwe for valour 🏆 , some the Silver Cross for bravery🥈 , some have Purple Hearts for injuries suffered in the line of duty💜💜💜

    We all are now towards the end of the show and we end with my favourite award, Wooden Spoon of Zimbabwe 🍴 Why I like this award, the public gets to vote, please cast your vote by calling or sending an SMS to this number on your screen 666.

    Please note standard network charges apply and any votes cast after the lines close in 15 minutes do not count. Thank you legal team👍

    Right, lets get to it.

    And our nominees are;

    1. WhatsApp group administrator licence fees! 🔋

    2. Aquas for everyone except you! 💦

    3. SpaceBoi👾 fails to travel to Bulawayo!

    Regai timbopinda muchitoro….I use Vegeboom before and after ich march and every training seshan.

    Image soap hoyee! Image soap hoyee! Kugeza hakusi kugeza pasina Image soap.

    Sahwira wauya wrong time! Wrong time, wrong time iwe uchibika ma Cake! Aiwa sha hupfu we Pearlenta…

    Train yavakuda kuenda.. Shandisa Protector Plus. Uri mu wise.

    Rooney’s call the Hire Brigade.

    Put the Diana over there, just be careful just take care.

    Relax guys sergeant major has lost his voice…hoo’ FALL IN! haaah! 😅

    Perfection soap, one each mudandinetse futi… iwe urikuenda kupi ne dish rangu, kabhavhaaa!

    Mwana wangu iyeye, haa’dje chimwe chinhu. Red Seal ndiyo Musimboti…

    Shop at Power sales where you money buys you…. MORE

    Well come back guys, drum roll please.. Mukoma Mbozhongora, Timmy (rest in peace Bhonzo), Ezra, Eric, Ndundu Chikara, please help me read out the winner.

    ……..

    Reply
  35. MYST🀄

    The heavens have opened here in Chitungwiza💦

    Thank you Lord for the rain 🙏

    Please may it rain in the farming areas too. The farmers need it more than we do in the towns. 🙏

    Reply
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